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the owner or operator of an automobile for an injury they
are generally held constitutional." 7
The instant case thus affords an opportunity to present
what appears at first glance as a tripartite problem but
which actually resolves itself into a two-sided proposition:
viz. (1) the majority common law view that the motorist
is liable to his guest for simple negligence, and (2) the
minority common law view, which in some states has been
codified in the form of guest statutes, to the effect that the
motorist is liable to his guest only where gross negligence
or the equivalent is shown. Maryland, it is seen, casts
its lot with the first group. Which is the better solution,
it is not the purpose of this note to attempt an answer.
Whether the advantage, provided by the minority view or
the guest statutes, of sometimes stifling collusive suits
which adversely affect the liability insurance companies is
sufficient to offset the cost of surrendering a former right
is another of the countless social problems with respect to
which there are today such strongly opposing views.
DEGREE OF CARE OWED BY A MOTORIST TO
CHILDREN ON THE HIGHWAY - CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Bozman v. State, use of Cronhardt'
An action was brought under the local version of Lord
Campbell's Act against Bozman by Cronhardt, the equitable plaintiff, for the wrongful death of his infant son,
not quite eight years of age. The boy, astride his bicycle
in broad day-light, came out into Green Spring Avenue, a
concrete highway, from the driveway adjacent to his
grandmother's home, and was struck by the car driven
by the defendant, as he came onto the highway. Defendant, by his own testimony (and that was the only testimony
in the case as to actual speed), was traveling between
thirty-five and forty miles per hour in a forty-five miles
per hour speed zone,2 and was about seventy-five feet from
37

See 111 A. L. R. 1011.

1 177 Md. 151, 9 A. (2) 60 (1939).
See also a more recent case, Stafford
v. Zake, 20 A. (2d) 144 (Md., 1941).
2 At the time of the accident (May 30th, 1938), Md. Code Supp. (1935)
Art. 56. See. 194(4) was then in force allowing a 45 m. p. h. speed limit
on rural highways; since then, by Md. Code (1939) Art. 56, Sec. 196(4)
the speed on such highways has been fixed at a 50 m. p. h. maximum.
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the boy when he first saw him. Defendant immediately
applied his brakes. According to the plaintiff's evidence
the skid marks in the roadway measured fifteen feet up
to the point of impact and from that point sixty additional
feet to the place where the car finally stopped. After a
verdict for the plaintiff, defendant appealed, urging that
the trial court erred in refusing his demurrer prayer and
his contributory negligence prayer. Held: Affimed.
The Court of Appeals, in sustaining the lower court's
rulings, held that excessive speed, which may constitute
negligence if it contributes to the accident, may be inferred
from such testimony as that the brakes were put on too
late, or that the car did not stop until it had gone an
extraordinary distance after the brakes were applied. Notwithstanding that the only evidence of actual speed was
offered by Bozman himself (and that was certainly within
the lawful limits), and that the infant sister of the deceased, aged ten years, testified only that the car of the
defendant was being driven "very fast", the Court said
that the skidding of an automobile after collision is a
"circumstance of evidential value in reference to the rate
of speed or whether the car was under control". 3 The
skidding in the instant case was only fifteen feet up to the
point where the youngster was struck and sixty feet from
the point of impact. The Court of Appeals in effect held
that such testimony was sufficient evidence of negligence
to take the case to the jury.
The case presents two general problems: (1) Did the
plaintiff meet the burden imposed upon him of showing
negligence on the part of defendant? (2) Was the infant
boy free of all contributory negligence?
As to the first problem, or the degree of care owed by
a motorist to children, there is no presumption of negligence against a motorist from the mere fact that he strikes
a child.4 The burden remains on the plaintiff to show that
the defendant committed a breach of his duty and was
thereby negligent.' Simply because a child is struck by
an automobile while playing in the street, or road, does
not entitle him to damages, nor entitle his parents to compensation for his death. In the past, the Maryland Court,
ICiting 2 BLASHFIELD, AuiOMoBiLE LAW, Sec. 11; Ellis v. Sanberg, 41
Cal. App. 506, 182 P. 792 (1919).
' Slaysman v. Gerst, 159 Md. 292, 150 A. 728 (1930) ; Mullikin v. Baltimore, 131 Md. 363, 102 A. 469 (1917).
Baltimore, etc. R. Co. v. Schwtndltng, 101 Pa. 258, 263 (1882).
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using the scale of degrees of care,0 has seemed to apply
to automobile cases the same rules of law governing the
responsibility owed to children as they applied in earlier
cases where children were injured by the operation of railroad trains.7 The infancy of the plaintiff does not enhance
either the degree of care or the measure of damages to be
awarded from the failure of the defendant to use ordinary
care.' The driver of an automobile owes no special degree
of care to a child; but he must use ordinary care and diligence under all the circumstances commensurate with the
standard of behaviour to be anticipated from the infant.9
After seeing the child, he is chargeable with the knowledge
that the infant may not act as an adult would act under
the same circumstances, and must govern his own actions
accordingly. 10
Several Maryland cases demonstrate the applicability
of these rules. In Ottenheimer v. Molohan," one of the
leading Maryland cases on the negligence of motorists
where children have been injured, the Court of Appeals
said:
"The well known habit of children while playing
(at the side of the road) to become oblivious to dangers
0 Note, The Tort Liability of the Proprietor of a Passenger Elevator
(1939) 3 Md. L. Rev. 353, 358, n. 17. The majority of jurisdictions including Maryland have adopted the "degree of care" negligence doctrine. The
degree of care owed will vary with the relationship involved. Thus, a
mere bailee owes the duty of "ordinary care", while the obligation to
exercise the "highest degree of care" is imposed upon the common carrier.
There can be little doubt but that a substantial difference exists between
the various levels of care in the minds of many of the courts which apply
them. In this connection, see note, Degrees of Care (1919) 19 Columbia
L. R. 166. In the case of State, etc., v. Norfolk and Western Rwy. Co.,
151 Md. 679, 688, 689, 135 A. 827, 831 (1927), the Court held that a prayer
imposing upon the driver of an automobile the duty to exercise "the highest degree of care and skill practicable under all circumstnaces" was erroneous in setting too high a degree of care for the driver to maintain in
reference to a guest in his car.
Bannon v. B. and 0. R. R., 24 Md. 108, 125 (1866).
8 Supra, n. 7.
1In the recent case of Abbott v. Railway Express Agency, 108 Fed. (2)
671 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940), It was held that, under the Maryland law, in view
of the fact that children are not expected to use the same care as adults,
the driver of an automobile must anticipate the actions of children that
would constitute negligence In adults. The duty owed by the driver of an
automobile to children is ordinary care and caution in such amount as
the particular situation demands. Hevermale v. Houck, 122 Md. 82, 89 A.
314 (1913); Deford v. Lohmeyer, 147 Md. 472, 128 A. 454 (1925).
10 Geiselman v. Schmidt, 106 Md. 580, 68 A. 202 (1907) ; United Rwys. v.
Carneal, 110 Md. 211, 72 A. 771 (1909); Ottenheimer v. Molohan, 146 Md.
175, 126 A. 127 (1924) ; Dervin v. "Frenler, 91 Vt. 398, 100 A. 760 (1917)
Mulhern v. Phila. Homeade Bread Co., 257 Pa. 22, 101 A. 74 (1917);
Patrick v. Deziel, 223 Mass. 505, 112 N. E. 223 (1916) ; Silberstein v.
Showell Fryer Co., 267 Pa. 298, 109 A. 701 (1920).
11146 Md. 175, 126 A. 127 (1924).
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of this character should have been a warning to the
defendant to slow down and turn as far away as practicable under the circumstances."
In Wickman v. Bohle, 2 a boy on a bicycle while turning
into a narrow lane to his right was struck from the rear
by the defendant motorist. The Court found the defendant
negligent and held that the slowing down of the boy on
the bicycle before turning was sufficient to put the defendant on notice so that he might anticipate the boy's possible
actions.
Again in the case of Mahan v. State, use of Carr,'3
where a child of three years of age, walking along the
shoulder of a suburban highway was struck and killed by
a taxicab, the Court of Appeals said:
"The rights of one operating a vehicle and a pedestrian on public highways are mutual, reciprocal and
equal. Neither may use it in disregard of the right
of the other to use it, and each must accommodate his
movement to the other's lawful use of it, each must
anticipate the other's possible presence and each must
recognize the dangers inherent in the manner in which
it may lawfully be used by the other."
But a driver is not compelled so to operate his car that
it can be stopped instantly when a child unexpectedly
runs in front of it.' 4 In R. and L. Transfer Co. v. State, use
of Schmidt,15 where a child sledding down an alley sped
out into the street into the path of an oncoming truck and
was killed, the Court of Appeals in reversing the lower
Court's rulings held that the driver of the truck, operating
at a low rate of speed, was free of negligence, since there
was no duty on him to look up the alley or to have anticipated that children would be sledding on a concrete alley.
In the Bozman case, the deceased infant certainly had
a right to be upon and use the highway; and in the exercise of due care, he had a right to cross the road on his
bicycle. 6 Even though a boy is riding his bicycle on the
Md. 694, 196 A. 326 (1938).
172 Md. 373, 191 A. 575 (1937).
"Borland v. Lenz, 196 Iowa 1148, 194 N. W. 215 (1928) ; Lovett v. Scott,
232 Mass. 541, 122 N. H. 646 (1919) ; MeAvoy v. Kromer, 277 Pa. 196, 120
A. .762 (1923); Goff v. Clarksbury Dairy Co., 86 W. Va. 237, 103 S. E. 58
(1920).
" 160 Md. 222, 153 A. 87 (1981).
10 Miles v. State, use of Wlstling, 174 NMd. 292, 198 A. 724 (1938) ; Edwards v. State, use of Buy, 166 Md. 217, 170 A.. 761 (1934).
12173
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highway solely for amusement he is rightfully there.17
However, it would be imposing upon a motorist an inexorable burden to require him so to operate his car that it
could be stopped instantly at the moment a child unexpectedly runs in front of it from some hidden lane or corner.' In this case we have none of those factors by which
the defendant could have been put on notice of the child's
presence and thus have become bound to act in anticipation
of the child. Yet, the lower Court's rulings in allowing
the case to go to the jury were sustained and evidence of
skid marks in the roadway," coupled with the testimony
of an infant witness that the car was being driven "very
fast",2 0 was held sufficient to make out a prima facie case
of negligence.
Thus, while the Maryland Court of Appeals seems to
insist that children and adults are to be treated alike, in
that only ordinary care is owed to both under all the circumstances, it appears that, in these cases where children
have been injured or killed, the Court takes a much more
liberal view both as to the quantum and quality of the facts
involved in determining whether the defendant has met
the norm of vigilance, caution, and skill demanded of him,
than if the same circumstances surrounded the injury of
an adult.
As to the second, or contributory negligence question,
the usual rule is that to withdraw the case from the consideration of the jury on the ground of contributory negligence of the deceased, the evidence must be such as to
show some act so decisively negligent as to leave no room
for difference of opinion thereon by reasonable minds.2
In the Bozman case, the Court summarily disposed of the
question by approving of the child's actions and saying
that the deceased infant did, from the evidence, look up
and down the road before he started across. This indiCoope v. Scannell, 238 Mass. 288, 130 N. E. 494 (1921).
1SSupra, n. 14.
19 In the case of Wolfe v. State, use of Brown, 173 Md. 103, 194 A. 823
(1937), the Court of Appeals said: "Skidding is not in itself, and without
more, evidence of negligence . . . nor is the mere speed, certainly within
lawful limits, apart from circumstances in connection with which it is to
be considered ordinarily evidence of negligence ....
Skidding may be
evidence of negligence if it appears that it was caused by a failure to take
reasonable precaution to avoid it, when the conditions at the time made
such a result probable in the absence of such precaution ...
"
Fillings
v. Diehlman, 168 Md. 306, 177 A. 400 (1935).
20 See Note, Testimony by Observer as to Speed of Moving Object (1941)
5 Md. L. Rev. 307.
21 Jones v. Wayman, 169 Md. 670, 182 A. 417 (1936).
17
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cated a certain degree of care on his part, since he was
apparently unaware of the approaching danger.
As to the negligence of an infant, the Courts have uniformly held that a child of tender years is not required
to conform to the standard of behaviour which it is reasonable to expect of an adult, but his conduct is to be judged
by the standard of behaviour to be expected from a child
of like age, intelligence, and experience.22 He cannot be
required to exercise, or be held to any higher degree of
care than might be expected for his years. 21 Considerations
that are sufficient to protect a person of mature age from
a conclusive imputation of negligence apply with greater
force to the action of a child as regards contributory negligence; 24 while some facts which may constitute contributory negligence on the part of an adult nfay not do so in
the case of a child of tender years, nevertheless an infant
must exercise such precautions for his own safety as would
ordinarily be attributable to one of his age.2 5
In Maryland it has been judged to be a jury question
as to whether a child of tender years is guilty of contributory negligence. The jury must be instructed that he is
only expected and required to exercise that degree of discretion and judgment which a normal child of his age with
average intelligence would ordinarily use under such circumstances. 26 To make a child guilty of contributory negligence where he is struck by an automobile, he must have
known of the car's approach in time, or by the use of reasonable diligence should have known of it in time to avoid
the accident.
The actions of the deceased infant in the instant case
were in accord with the course of movements approved
by the Court of Appeals in the case of Bielski v. Rising.
There the Court held that where a boy of ten years of age
was pushing a wagon across the street and looked when he
left the sidewalk and saw the truck a block away, but
looked no more, he was not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. But, the instant case is of particular interest because of the dictum "a child of four years
22 Supra, n.

13.

R. R. v. Fryer, 30 Md. 47 (1869); McMahon v. Northern
Central Rwy., 39 Md. 438 (1874) ; United Rwys. v. Carneal, 110 Md. 232,
72 A. 771 (1909) ; W., B. and A. R. R. v. State, use of Kolish, 153 Md. 119,
138 A. 484 (1927). See RESTATEMENT, TOTS, Sec. 283e.
24 Deford v. Lohmeyer, 147 Md. 472, 478, 128 A. 454, 456 (1925).
Supra, n. 4.
Zulver v. Roberts, 162 Md. 636, 161 A. 9 (1932).
27 Taxicab Co. v. Emmanuel, 125 Md. 246, 93 A. 807 (1915).
2s 163 Md. 492, 163 A. 207 (1932).
21B. and 0.
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of age can not be guilty of contributory negligence under
any circumstances" and the citation of the case of Mahan
v. State, use of Carr, 9 as authority for this ruling.
The Mahan case involved the action for wrongful death
of a boy of three years of age, and though the Court affirmed the action of the trial Court in refusing the contributory negligence prayer offered in the case, because it
would have imposed on the infant of three years the same
measure of care and caution that would have been required
of a reasonably prudent adult, the Court in no way suggested in its opinion that it would have been improper
to grant a contributory negligence prayer drawn in accordance with the law, merely because of the age of the
deceased infant.
The Mahan case recognizes that in Maryland one of
tender years may be guilty of negligence barring his recovery, citing United Railways v. Carneal;0 but he is not
to be held to the same measure and kind of care that would
be required of a normal person of full age 3 ' but only to
that degree of care which should be exercised by one of his
own age. The opinion stated that "the great weight of
authority is opposed to the proposition that a child of a
little over four years of age can be guilty of contributory
negligence", and cited State, use of Kolish, v. W., B. & A.
R. R.11 (the first Kolish case) as authority for that statement.
The Court certainly made that statement in the first
Kolish case but did not stop there. It said further that although the proposition was opposed to the great weight of
authority it found support in Maryland in the case of United
8
The Carneal case held that the quesRwys. v. Carneal
negligence of an infant not quite three
of
contributory
tion
years of age was properly submitted to the jury; and both
the Kolish cases held that the question of contributory
negligence of a child of four and one-half years of age was
properly submitted for the consideration of the jury.
In the case of Zulver v. Roberts" the Court of Appeals
said:
"It seems clear that the weight of authority in this
country outside of our state supports such a contention
29 Supra, n. 13.
80 110 Md. 211, 72 A. 771 (1909).
81 W., B. and A. R. R. v. State, use of Kolish, 153 Md. 119, 124, 137 A.
484, 485 (1927) ; State, use of Kolish, v. W., B. and A. R. R., 149 Md. 443,
460,
8 2 131 A. 822, 829 (1926).
Supra, n. 31.
88 Supra, n. 30.
84162 Md. 636, 640, 641, 161 A. 9, 10, 11 (1932).
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(that a boy of seven years, as a matter of law, cannot
be charged with contributory negligence), some of the
courts holding that children under the age of six are
incapable of contributory negligence while the apparent majority fix seven as the age below which they
are conclusively presumed to be incapable. This, however, is not the rule of this jurisdiction, it being here
held that the question is one to be submitted to the
jury under proper instructions. In these cases s5 the
question of contributory negligence of children as
young as three years old has been submitted for determination by a jury . . ." (Italics supplied).
Thus we have the Bozman case stating as dictum that in
Maryland a child of four years of age cannot be guilty of
contributory negligence under any circumstances, relying
on the dictum in the Mahan case as authority. That case
cites the case of United Rwys. v. Carneal6 whose decision
was definitely to the contrary, and the other Maryland authority supports the Carneal case.
In its earlier holdings, the Maryland Court, as it
acknowledges,3 '7 is contra the vast majority of cases
throughout the country. Most of the United States jurisdictions adhere to the "use of reason" doctrine in determining whether a child is capable of being guilty of contributory negligence or not, and hold that children under
seven years of age are incapable of being guilty of such
fault.3 However, recent cases in at least five other States,
in addition to Maryland, reject the rule that a child less
than seven years is incapable of committing such negligence. 9 The "seven year age" rule, it has been asserted,
15B. and 0. R. R. v.State, use of Fryer, 30 Md. 47 (1869); Wise v.
Ackerman, 76 Md. 375, 25 A. 424 (1892); State v. Wash., B. and A. Electric
R. Co., 149 Md. 443, 131 A. 822 (1925) ; Wash., B. and A. R. Co. v. State,
etc., 513 Md. 119, 138 A. 484 (1927) ; United Rwys. v. Carneal, 110 Md. 211,
72 A. 771 (1909).

16 Supra, n. 30, 33, 36.
8,148 Md. 443.
88 Claren v. Gillespie, 250 Ill.
App. 53 (1928) ; Belcher, Admr., v. Smyth
Co., 243 Ii. ApP. 65 (1926); Tupman's Admr. v. Schmidt, 200 Ky. 88, 254
S. W. 199 (1923) ; Johnson v. Herring, 89 Mont. 420, 300 Pac. 535 (1931):
Flickinger v. Phillips, 221 Iowa 837, 267 N. W. 101 (1936); Chitwood v.
Chitwood, 159 S. C. 109, 156 S. E. 179 (1930) ; and see note Contributory
Negligence of Young Children (1937) 44 W. Va. L. Quart. 55.
10 Dupuis v. Heider, 113 Fla. 679, 152 So. 659 (1934) ; Thornton v. Ionia
Fair Association, 229 Mich. 1, 200 N. W. 958 (1924); Eckhardt v. Hanson,
196 Minn. 270, 264 N. W. 776 (1986) ; Morris v. Furniture Co., 207 N. C.
358, 117 S. E. 13 (1934) ; Arivabeno v. Muse, 12 N. J. Misc. 729, 174 A.
691 (1934) ; and Garis v. Eberling, 18 Teun. Ap. 1, 71 S. W. (2d) 215
(1934).
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is borrowed from the criminal law and is but arbitrary at
best.4" It is suggested that more capacity is required to
understand the nature of a criminal act than is necessary
to the exercise of care for one's own safety.
With this state of the authorities, the Maryland rule
rests in the cases discussed above. The dictum in the Bozman case, which we are discussing, might be considered as
an expression by the Court of Appeals of an inclination to
hold a child of four years of age, or under, free from the
blemishes of contributory negligence. However, in view
of the Zulver case, the first Kolish case, the recognition of
these cases in the Mahan case, and the definite holding of
the Carneal case, that a child not yet three years of age
can be guilty of contributory negligence, it might be better
viewed that the dictum in the instant case is but a misinterpretation of a prior incomplete quotation, rather than
an expression of policy by the Court of Appeals, by which
we could be guided in the future. 1
Hence, the position of Maryland remains with the
minority jurisdictions which allow the negligence vel non
of an infant of such tender years to be decided by the jury
under the proper instructions that such infant is only to be
held to the same degree of care which children of like age
and intelligence would be expected to exercise.
EFFECT OF DISCLOSURE OF DEFENDANT'S COVERAGE BY LIABILITY INSURANCE
Gwynn Oak Park v. Becker 1
A minor child, while visiting Defendant's amusement
park, sustained serious injuries as a result of a fall from a
sliding-board. Suit was brought by his mother, both as
next friend to recover for the injuries the child sustained,
and in her own behalf for loss of his services. Plaintiff's
witness was asked on direct examination whether, at the
time the child was injured, someone from Defendant's
office took a statement from the child; she answered: "I
don't remember, because I was going back and forth. They
may have and may not have, but they were trying to get
,0 Note, Contributory Negligence of Young Children (1937)

L. Q. 55, 57.

41 See a recent case, Stafford v. Zake, 20 A.

1 177 Md. 528, 10 A. (2d) 625 (1940).

(2d)

44 W. Va.

144 (Md., 1941).

